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U.S. War Powers and the United Nations 
Security Council 
INTRODUCTION 
The constitutionally-mandated division of war powers in the United 
States has promoted a healthy democratic rivalry between the Presi-
dent and Congress, but has also caused ambiguity in the vital power to 
protect national security. 1 This domestic constitutional issue is further 
complicated by an increasing global reliance in the post Cold War era 
on the United Nations (U.N.) and the collective security provisions in 
its Charter.2 The United Nations has added another dimension to the 
debate on the power to involve U.S. forces in foreign conflicts, raising 
important issues under both U.S. law and the U.N. Charter. 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to declare 
war, raise and support Armies, to provide and maintain a Navy and to 
make rules for the regulation of these forces. 3 According to Article II, 
"[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy 
of the United States. "4 A general consensus exists among constitutional 
scholars that the Framers sought to provide a balance between the 
President and the Congress with regard to war powers, installing a 
"democratic check" on the President, in contrast to the historical 
unilateral war-making powers of kings.5 The controversial War Powers 
Resolution of 1973 (WPR), enacted over President Nixon's veto at the 
end of the Vietnam War, was designed to constrict further the Presi-
dent's ability to introduce U.S. military forces into hostilities without 
congressional approval. 6 Congress intended the WPR to compel it to 
reassert its constitutional duty regarding war and peace.7 It took this 
action in response to charges that it had been avoiding this duty since 
1 See U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, art. II, § 2. 
2 See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39-51. 
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
4 !d. art. II, § 2. 
5 See, e.g., Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President and the United 
Nations, 81 GEO. LJ. 597, 597 (1993) [hereinafter Stromseth, Rethinking]. 
6 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988). 
7 See John Hart Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted A War Powers Act That Worked, 88 Cot.uM. L. REv. 
1379, 1379-80 (1988). 
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the 1950s when President Truman sent troops to Korea as part of a 
U.N. police action without formal, explicit congressional authoriza-
tion.8 This intention has not been realized in practice as every Presi-
dent since Nixon has routinely denied that he needs authority from 
Congress to introduce military forces into hostile situations abroad.9 
Like President Truman in the Korean War, Presidents Bush and Clin-
ton have dispatched U.S. armed forces to execute U.N. Security Coun-
cil Resolutions in the Persian Gulf and Haiti respectively without for-
mal, explicit congressional approval. 10 
The collective security system of the United Nations was devised in 
1945 in an effort to restrain the unilateral use of force that had resulted 
in World War II and to create a mechanism to prevent war and to 
resolve disputes peacefully.U If this effort to avoid aggression failed, the 
U.N. Security Council could recommend or take action in the form of 
economic and diplomatic measures, escalating to the authorization of 
collective military action to restore peace. 12 The Cold War prevented 
the full implementation of the U.N. collective security system in every 
situation because the competing interests of the United States and the 
Soviet Union precluded effective cooperation. 13 
The end of the Cold War has raised expectations around the world 
for the United Nations to help resolve internal conflicts in places such 
as Somalia and Haiti and to respond to international conflicts such as 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.14 These rising expectations, whether 
realistic or not, have led to a call for a bolstering of the power and 
resources at the disposal of the U.N. Security Council so that it is better 
prepared to face these increasing burdens. 15 A formalization of the 
U.N. security apparatus under Article 43, with its provisions for special 
8 /d. at 1379. President Truman based the legality of his actions in Korea on United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions. Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman 
Act?, 89 AM.J. lNT'L L. 21, 21 (1995); see also S.C. Res. 82, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., Res. & Dec. at 
4, U.N. Doc. S/INF/5/Rev.1 (1950); S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., Res. & Dec. at 5, U.N. 
Doc. S/INF/5/Rev.1 (1950). 
9 See JOHN LEHMAN, MAKING WAR 97, 100, 128 (1992); Fisher, supra note 8, at 21. 
10 See Fisher, supra note 8, at 21. 
11 Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 598. 
12 U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 42. The five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are 
the United States, Great Britain, France, China and Russia (which replaced the Soviet Union 
upon its demise). 
13 Notable exceptions include the Korean Crisis in june, 1950 when the Soviet representative 
was absent during the Security Council vote, sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in 1965, and 
an arms embargo against South Africa in 1977. Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 598 n.lO. 
14 See Boutros Boutros·Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 89 (1992). 
15 See id. 
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agreements to make troops available on an "on-call" basis for U.N. 
purposes, is viewed as one way of dealing with these rising expecta-
tions.16 The formal arrangements would be a realization of the original 
structural plan for collective security under the U.N. CharterP 
The recent increase in scope and frequency of Security Council-
authorized actions involving military force which have been under-
taken without congressional approval and the calls for the implemen-
tation of Article 43 of the U.N. Charter raise questions about the 
legality of these U.N. actions under U.S.law. As the U.N. is increasingly 
looked to for authority before the commencement of military action, 
the implications of responding to mandates of the U.N. Security Coun-
cil must be examined, with special attention placed on any transfer of 
U.S. war powers to an international body such as the United Nations. 18 
Several notable questions arise from this issue. 
The first is whether the congressional power to declare war is trans-
ferred to the President or the U.N. when U.S. armed forces participate 
in U.N. military actions without congressional approvai.l9 Even before 
this issue is addressed, however, it must be determined whether a 
U.N.-mandated military action should legally be considered war, thus 
requiring congressional authorization, or if it is not war at all and 
congressional authorization is therefore unnecessary.20 Participation in 
U.N. military actions by U.S. forces also raises the question of the 
legality of those forces serving under non-U.S. command.21 The answer 
to this question is, in turn, based on whether the Constitution allows 
the President to delegate his powers as Commander in Chief to a 
foreign or international body.22 A careful examination of the legality 
of the U.N. collective security system in the context of the U.S. Consti-
tution is necessary to clarify the ambiguities that consistently arise 
when the United States contemplates participation in U.N. military 
actions. 
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of U.S. war powers and 
the U.N. collective security system. This section discusses the ongoing 
16 See U.N. CHARTER art. 43. 
17 See id. 
18 See Michael]. Glennon & Allison R. Hayward, Collective Security and the Constitution: Can the 
Commander in Chief Power Be Delegated to the United Nations?, 82 GEO. LJ. 1573, 1575 (1994). 
19 See id. 
20 See Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, Agora: The Gulf Crisis-UN Police Action in Lieu of War: 
"The Old OrderChangeth,"85 AM.]. INT'L L. 63,63 (1991). 
21 See Glennon & Hayward, supra note 18, at 1575, 1586. 
22 !d. at 1575. 
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war powers debate between the President and Congress both before 
and after the passage of the 1973 War Powers Resolution (WPR) and 
the impact of the U.N. system on this debate. Part II provides case 
studies of U.S. actions taken under U.N. auspices in Korea, the Persian 
Gulf and Haiti. Part III analyzes the unique characteristics of U.N. 
actions in the context of the war powers laws of the United States and 
examines the implications of certain proposals for changes to both the 
U.N. collective security system and U.S. war powers laws. This Note 
concludes that, as the Founding Fathers intended, presidential pri-
macy in foreign affairs has succeeded in practice for 200 years despite 
attempts by the Congress to impose constraints and should continue. 
The Congress has a constitutionally guaranteed role in war powers and 
foreign affairs, but the WPR is an unnecessary, ineffective, and ulti-
mately unconstitutional way to play it. In the face of the increasing 
importance of the U.N. collective security system, the current ad hoc 
system will continue to preserve freedom of action and serve U.S. 
interests, providing a constitutional way for the United States to par-
ticipate in international police actions under Chapter VII of the U.N. 
Charter. 
I. HISTORY OF U.S. WAR PowERS LAw AND 
U.N. COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM 
A. The History of War Powers in the United States 
The struggle between the President and the Congress over war 
powers has continued throughout American history as the Constitu-
tion granted powers over foreign affairs to each but neglected to 
provide a final word on which would be dominant. 23 It is therefore 
quite helpful to look to the original intent of the Founding Fathers for 
guidance. These men were influenced most heavily by Locke, Montes-
quieu and Blackstone, who espoused the benefits of executive domi-
nance in foreign affairs.24 Professor Louis Henkin has observed: "[t]he 
executive power ... was not defined because it was well understood by 
the Framers raised on Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone. "25 
23 See U.S. CaNST. art. I, § 8, art. II, § 2. 
24 ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 53 (1991). Locke, Montes-
quieu, and Blackstone argued that legislative bodies lacked the competence to manage foreign 
affairs because they lacked the essential qualities of unity of design, secrecy, speed, and dispatch. 
!d. 
25 LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AnAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 43 (1972). 
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It should be noted that Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution 
provides that "all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States .... "while Article II is more expansive, 
granting "the executive power" to the President.26 This important dif-
ference made it necessary for the Founders to enumerate each foreign 
affairs power of Congress, while allowing them to deliver the greater 
part of the executive foreign affairs power to the President in one short 
sentence of Article IJ.27 The President's broad grant of executive power 
was similar to that of English kings, but the Constitution checked 
against abuse in several notable areas.28 For example, the Senate was 
given the power to approve or deny treaties and diplomatic appoint-
ments by the President (to ensure the suitability of those appoint-
ments), and the Congress as a whole was given the power to declare 
war and raise and support armies. 29 The Founding Fathers considered 
these grants of power to be an exception to the extensive executive 
powers granted to the President and were therefore expected to be 
interpreted narrowly. 30 
The Constitution is more explicit in naming the President the "Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of 
the militia of the several states .... "31 The lack of debate at the Con-
stitutional Convention on this very important issue demonstrates a 
degree of consensus among the Founders that this power should lie 
with the President.32 WhileJames Madison was known to be concerned 
about the concentration of power in the executive, he favored deleting 
language in the draft Constitution empowering Congress to "make 
war" and replacing it with "declare war" as this would leave to the 
executive the power to repel sudden attacks. 33 The language was in fact 
replaced, and because nothing in the constitutional debates indicates 
that the Framers intended a congressional declaration to precede 
every use of the military by the Commander in Chief, there was an 
implicit granting to the President of some measure of power to defend 
national security without a congressional declaration of war. 34 
26 U.S. CaNST. art I, § I, art. II, § I (emphasis added). 
27 TuRNER, supra note 24, at 55. 
28 !d. 
29 See U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 8, art. II, § 2. 
30 TURNER, supra note 24, at 55. 
31 U.S. CaNsT. art II, § I. 
32 See DAVID LocKE HALL, THE REAGAN WARS: A CoNSTITUTIONAL PERSPf:CTIVE ON WAR 
POWERS AND THE PRESIDENCY 49 (I99I). 
33 Id. at 50. 
34 !d. 
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The Constitution's ambiguous delineation of war powers actually 
came up quite early in American history in the context of the vexing 
problem of undeclared war. 35 In the midst of the Napoleonic Wars in 
1798, President John Adams faced the refusal of France to recognize 
American rights of neutrality as it captured and destroyed U.S. mer-
chant ships trading with the British.36 Adams used the newly-formed 
U.S. Navy to fight off the French in an action that he characterized as 
"neither peace nor war" while deflecting great pressure from Congress 
for a formal declaration of war. 37 President Thomas Jefferson also used 
the Navy to battle pirates along the Barbary Coast of North Africa for 
eight months before Congress recognized the existence of a state of 
war and sanctioned a military response. 38 
Justice Washington, writing for the Supreme Court in an 1800 case 
arising from the naval conflicts with the French, had a prime oppor-
tunity to rule on this issue and attempted to characterize the differ-
ences between declared war and undeclared war respectively as "sol-
emn" and "imperfect war": 
If it be declared in form, it is called solemn, and is of the 
perfect kind; because one whole nation is at war with another 
whole nation .... In such a war, all the members act under 
a general authority, and all the rights and consequences of 
war attach to their condition. 
But hostilities may subsist between two nations, more 
confined in its nature and extent; being limited as to places, 
persons and things; and this is more properly termed imper-
fect war; because not solemn, and because those who are 
authorized to commit hostilities act under special authority, 
and can go no further than to the extent of their commis-
sion.39 
A study performed by the Library of Congress found more than 210 
cases in which U.S. armed forces were used abroad between 1 798 and 
1983.40 The study found that the U.S. Congress issued a declaration of 
35 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Congress and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 51 FoREIGN AFF. 
72, 83 (1972). Between 1700 and 1870 in Europe and America, there were at least 107 cases of 
hostilities that began without a formal declaration of war and only 10 cases where a formal 
declaration of war preceded hostilities. /d. 
36 See LEHMAN, supra note 9, at 76. 
37 /d. 
38 /d. at 76-77. 
39 The Eliza, 4 U.S. 37, 39-40 (1800). 
40 LEHMAN, supra note 9, at 57-58. 
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war only five times during this period, with four of those declarations 
coming after hostilities had already broken out. 41 
The cause of the ambiguity in the division of war powers lies with 
the ambiguous wording of the Constitution itself, which has allowed 
the gradual accumulation of powers by strong executives.42 Periods of 
presidential independence in military affairs occurred during the 
terms of strong men responding to unusual circumstances: Adams, 
Jefferson, and Madison in the early period, Polk in the Mexican-Ameri-
can War, Lincoln in the Civil War, Theodore Roosevelt on the Panama 
Canal, Wilson in World War One, Franklin Delano Roosevelt in World 
War Two, and Truman in Korea.43 These periods of alternating con-
gressional and presidential dominance over war powers suggest that 
the powers exercised by strong presidents in critical times are personal 
attributes which are not transferable to the Presidency itself. 44 
Congressional reactions with deep incursions into presidential 
power often follow periods of presidential primacy in war powers.45 
Several instances of this pattern have occurred throughout American 
history. 46 The most glaring intrusion into executive power has been the 
passage of the WPR in 1973, which was followed by the weak presiden-
cies of Gerald Ford and jimmy Carter.47 
Congress enacted the WPR after the Vietnam War in an effort to 
recoup some of the war powers that it believed it had lost to strong 
executives over the years.48 The WPR's stated purpose is to "insure that 
the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will 
apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostili-
ties, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of 
such forces .... "49 The Resolution was intended to limit the Presi-
dent's role as Commander in Chief to circumstances in which a decla-
ration of war, specific statutory authorization or national emergency 
exists.50 Other sections do, however, seem to permit the President to 
41 !d. at 58. 
42 See U.S. CaNST. art. I,§ 8, art. II, § 2. 
43 LEHMAN, supra note 9, at 78-79. 
44 See id. at 79. 
45 !d. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 See Louis Fisher, War Powers and the Use of Force, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PoWER TO 
Go TO WAR 24-25 (Morton H. Halperin & Gary M. Stern eds., 1994) [hereinafter Fisher, War 
Powers]. 
49 50 U.S. C. § 1541 (a). 
50 !d.§ 1541(c). 
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use military force without congressional authorization for up to ninety 
days.51 Procedures were devised to constrain presidential actions and 
to help achieve these objectives: initial and regular consultation with 
Congress, written reports to Congress and the "sixty-day clock."52 Sec-
tion 1542 of the WPR calls for consultation with Congress in every 
possible instance prior to introducing U.S. armed forces "into hostili-
ties or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
clearly indicated by the circumstances," and regularly until the matter 
is resolved.53 While he is not legally required to do so, the President 
would be well advised to keep Congress informed because a coopera-
tive relationship resulting in understanding and approval contributes 
greatly to the potential long term success of foreign policy initiatives. 54 
The President, however, is not an agent of Congress and cannot be 
required to consult with it on matters that the Constitution has as-
signed to his own purview.55 
Section 1543 of the WPR includes the reporting requirements for 
instances in which U.S. Armed Forces equipped for combat are intro-
duced into a hostile environment in the absence of a declaration of 
war.56 The President must submit a report to Congress within forty-
eight hours. 57 This report must detail the circumstances, the authority 
for, and the estimated scope and duration of the involvement. 58 
Section 1544 of the WPR has proven to be the most controversial 
and constitutionally problematic section.59 The provision states that 
within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted under Section 
1543, the President shall terminate use of the armed forces unless 
Congress has either declared war, authorized continuation of the ac-
tion, or cannot meet because of an attack on the United States.60 The 
51 Fisher, War Powers, supra note 48, at 24. 
52 See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1542, 1543(a), 1544(b). Section 1544 of the WPR originally included possible 
congressional actions in the form of concurrent resolutions (simple majorities in each House of 
Congress) to remove forces, but the Supreme Court's ruling in Immigration and Naturalization 
Service v. Chadha invalidated it when it declared unconstitutional the power of Congress to 
invalidate actions of the Executive Branch by resolution (legislative veto). See id. § 1544(c); 
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-59 (1983). 
53 50 U.S.C. § 1542. 
54 See TuRNER, supra note 24, at 110-11. 
55 /d. at 110. 
56 50 U.S.C. § 1543. 
57 /d. 
58 /d. 
59 LEHMAN, supra note 9, at 95. 
6050 U.S.C. §§ 1543(a), 1544(b). 
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President may extend the sixty-day period to ninety days upon deter-
mining (and certifYing to Congress in writing) that the continued use 
of armed force is necessary for safety reasons in the process of remov-
ing the deployed forces. 61 The final provision of Section 1544 allowing 
a legislative veto over the President's use of the armed forces, even 
during the first sixty or ninety days, was invalidated when the legislative 
veto was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.62 
The primary question raised by the WPR's consultation and report-
ing requirements concerns the instances and points at which these 
requirements are activated. 63 Consultations are required when intro-
ducing armed forces into "hostilities" or "imminent involvement in 
hostilities."64 The ambiguity of the word "hostilities," however, leads to 
ambiguity in standards.65 This ambiguity raises the question of how 
early the President must approach Congress for discussions for them 
to qualifY as consultations under the WPR.66 There is no "bright-line" 
standard because it is nearly impossible to set a time limit due to the 
uncontrollable nature of foreign affairs. 57 The sixty-day clock also pre-
sents problems arising from the difficulty in determining the begin-
ning and end of the time period, especially when hostilities are spo-
radic. 58 
As a result of the vagueness of the WPR, the President has, in 
practice, ignored and avoided his requirements under the resolution.69 
In the quarter century that has passed since the WPR was enacted, 
history has shown that Congress behaves just as it did before, support-
ing presidential action when probability for success is high and it is 
61 !d.§ 1544(b). 
62 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. The separability provisions of § 1548 served to 
save the remaining sections of the WPR even after the legislative veto provision was invalidated. 
See 50 U.S.C. § 1548. 
63 HALL, supra note 32, at 106. 
64 50 U.S.C. § 1542. A Federal District Court was tasked with defining "hostilities" when it was 
asked to determine whether U.S. troops in El Salvador were facing imminent "hostilities" but 
found the issue "nonjusticiable." See Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C.), ajf'd, 720 F.2d 
1355 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1982). 
65 See 50 U.S.C. § 1542. 
66 HALL, supra note 32, at 107. 
67 See id. 
68 !d. at 111. During President Reagan's 1987 deployment of the Middle East Force to the 
Persian Gulf, the forces were not intentionally introduced to hostilities until the September 21 
attack on the Iran Ajr, five months after deployment. !d. at 106. After this date, hostilities were 
neither imminent nor clearly indicated, so even if the attack on the Iran Ajr started the sixty-day 
clock, the clock stopped because the hostilities ended. !d. at 106-07. 
69 LEHMAN, supra note 9, at 97. 
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politically expedient to do so.70 The WPR is not a necessary instrument 
for Congress to become involved in the war-making process because 
its war powers are determined by the Constitution rather than by its 
own resolutions. 71 Congress might more effectively address the war 
powers issue on an ad hoc basis rather than with the WPR, since this 
would enable it to "address [the] substantive issues ... without [the] 
procedural distractions. "72 
B. The History of the United Nations Collective Security System 
The idea of collective security dates back at least to 478 B.C. when 
a group of Greek city-states combined under the leadership of Athens 
to counter Persia.73 A more recent example is the Holy Alliance of 
Austria, Russia, and Prussia, which was formed in 1815 with the pur-
pose of interceding to protect conservative monarchies from insurgen-
cies.74 The U.N. collective security provisions, however, are rooted in 
the League of Nations Covenant of 1919.75 
The fatally flawed provisions of Articles 16 and 17 of the League 
Covenant called upon member states to contribute to a multi-national 
force upon the recommendation of the League Council when a coun-
try's act of war violated the Covenant.76 This collective security plan 
failed because member states were not required to follow the recom-
mendations of the Council, which had no standing force of its own.77 
In the wake of World War II, therefore, states endeavored to make the 
United Nations a body which could not only recommend, but could 
also take action. 78 
Aware of the shortcomings of the voluntary measures of the League 
of Nations, the U.N. Security Council received the authority to issue 
binding decisions to counter aggression and threats to the peace under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 79 Chapter VII outlines a steadily 
increasing level of responses to address the actions of rogue states.80 
7o Id. 
71 HALL, supra note 32, at 127. 
72 !d. 
73 Glennon & Hayward, supra note 18, at 1576. Collective security involves countries combining 
to create a collective force. ld. 
74 !d. 
7fo ld. 
76 See LEAGUE OF NATIONS CovENANT arts. 16--17. 
77 See Glennon & Hayward, supra note 18, at 1576--77. 
78 See Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 598. 
79 PETER R. BAEHR & LEON GORDENKER, THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE 1990s 65-66 (1992). 
80 U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. 
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The Security Council must first recognize that a breach of the peace 
exists and then decide which actions should be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42.81 At the same time, the Security Council must 
take provisional measures to prevent an aggravation of the situation.82 
Non-military measures in the form of an interruption of economic or 
diplomatic relations, communications, or travel provide the first level 
of coercion.83 These sanctions are designed to create an increasingly 
unpleasant atmosphere for the aggressor and encourage him to cease 
his activity.84 In practice, however, these sanctions usually fall short of 
their goal, because either the target endures their effect or members 
do not fully implement them.85 Aware of the fact that economic sanc-
tions might prove inadequate, the Security Council has been granted 
the power to take such military action "as may be necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security."86 
The boldest and most far-reaching provision of Chapter VII was 
Article 43, which envisioned special agreements under which member 
states would make armed forces available to the Security Council on 
its calJ.87 These agreements were to be negotiated as soon as possible 
and ratified by member states according to their respective constitu-
tional processes.88 A Military Staff Committee consisting of the Chiefs 
of Staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council were 
to advise and assist the Council on the use and command of the forces 
at its disposal.89 
The Truman Administration and the Seventy-Ninth Congress recog-
nized that the Charter's provisions for the collective use of force raised 
war powers concerns under the U.S. Constitution.9° Several senators 
argued that the war powers of Congress were being transferred uncon-
stitutionally to the Security Council or to the American representative 
on the Security Council who is appointed by the President.91 Senators 
wary of the Charter suggested that a Senate reservation to the Charter 
81 !d. art. 39. 
82 !d. art. 40. 
83 !d. art. 41. 
84 BAEHR & GoRDENKER, supra note 79, at 66. 
85 !d. 
86 See U.N. CHARTER art. 42. 
87 !d. art. 43. 
88 !d. 
89 !d. art. 47. 
90 Jane E. Stromseth, Treaty Constraints: The United Nations Charter and War Powers, in THE 
CoNSTITUTION AND THE PowER To Go To WAR, supra note 48, at 83, 84 [hereinafter Strom-
seth, Treaty Constraints]. 
91 !d. 
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be included that would require congressional re-authorization for each 
new force commitment as a check on presidential power.92 Supporters 
of the Charter contended that this reservation would violate the Char-
ter's spirit and the President's constitutional role as Commander in 
Chief.93 The objections were taken into consideration, but the majority 
of the Congress supported the Charter with the belief that the United 
States could provide a limited number of forces to the Security Council 
under an Article 43 special agreement for police actions, while still 
preserving the power of Congress to declare war in instances warrant-
ing the large-scale mobilization of U.S. forces.94 
The difficulty of defining the scope of the President's "police" power 
under the Charter might be alleviated by clarifying these definitions 
in the actual Article 43 special agreement.95 This agreement would 
describe the number, type and degree of readiness of units to be 
dedicated to the Security Council and would have to be approved by 
Congress according to the United Nations Participation Act.96 If the 
President wanted to increase the number of forces delegated to the 
Security Council, he would have to obtain additional authorization 
from Congress.97 
In 1946, the Security Council summoned the Military Staff Commit-
tee and tasked it with drafting a model Article 43 agreement.98 Under 
the Committee's model agreement, member states would designate a 
portion of their domestic forces for U.N. missions but would continue 
to house, maintain and command those forces until a crisis arose.99 
Upon being called by the Security Council for service, the units would 
retain their own commanders but would fall under the operational 
control of a Supreme Commander appointed by the Council. 100 The 
United States was supportive of Article 43, but was committed to pre-
serving its right to maintain its own independent forces for deployment 
and intended to utilize its Security Council veto to dictate when forces 
could be called upon. 101 
92 Glennon & Hayward, supra note 18, at 1580. 
93 Id. 
94 See Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 604. 
95 Stromseth, Treaty Constraints, supra note 90, at 86; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 43. 
96 Stromseth, Treaty Constraints, supra note 90, at 86. 
97 Id. 
98 Glennon & Hayward, supra note 18, at 1581. 
99 ld. at 1582. 
1oo Jd. 
101 See id. at 1584. 
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The realities and rivalries of the Cold War soon brushed away the 
idyllic visions of the U.N. Charter, and the intentions of Article 43 were 
never fulfilled. While U.N. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
has recently called for Article 43 agreements to be negotiated and for 
members to designate troops for peace enforcement, the Security 
Council has had to rely on the willingness of member states to provide 
troops on an ad hoc basis for U.N. missions. 102 
II. THE INTERSECTION OF THE U.N. CHARTER AND 
U.S. WAR POWERS LAWS IN PRACTICE 
Even without the formalized U.N. collective security structure as 
outlined by Article 43, significant legal issues have arisen from U.S. 
participation in U.N. missions under Chapter VII. In the absence of 
specific agreements or "contracts" under Article 43, the debate over 
the definition of "police power" and the point (if any) at which the 
President's use of armed forces requires congressional approval in 
U.N. actions has never been answered. The legal requirements under 
the war powers provisions of U.S. law and legal justifications for the 
participation of U.S. armed forces in U.N. missions will be examined 
in case studies of three significant U.N. missions in which the United 
States has participated: Korea, the Persian Gulf and Haiti. 
A. Korea 
Korea was the first instance of the use of force by the U.N. 103 In 
reality, however, it was a reaction by the United States and fifteen other 
states to preserve South Korea after an invasion by communist North 
Korea. 104 From the outset of the hostilities, the Korea conflict set a 
troubling precedent for the champions of strong congressional war 
powers. 105 
The U.N. action in Korea provided the first test of the President's 
authority to deploy U.S. armed forces to execute a Security Council 
resolution authorizing the creation of a "police force."106 The Security 
Council had decided under Article 39 that a breach of the peace had 
102 See Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 598-99. 
103 BAEHR & GoRDENKER, supra note 79, at 69. The Soviet Representative to the U.N. was not 
present at the vote and was thus unable to veto the proposed action. !d. at 70. 
104 !d. 
105 Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 621. 
106 Franck & Patel, supra note 20, at 70. 
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occurred and called upon North Korea to withdraw its forces. 107 As the 
Security Council lacked its own forces, it had to call upon U.N. member 
states two days later to render assistance to the South Korean govern-
ment to repel its neighbor's attack and restore peace and security to 
the region. 108 
The dispatch of troops to Korea by President Truman without con-
gressional approval caused debate in the Senate.109 President Truman 
argued his authority to send troops for the U.N. action on several 
grounds. First, he argued that his role as Commander in Chief permit-
ted him to take military action to protect the broad interests of U.S. 
foreign policy.110 Second, he argued that the U.N. Charter is a treaty 
which he has a duty to faithfully execute, and that any U.N. action is 
an "international police action" rather than an act of war and there-
fore, the power of Congress to declare war does not apply.lll A majority 
of the Senate supported the constitutionality of Truman's actions and 
agreed that the United States had a duty to discharge its obligations 
to the Security Council.112 Senator William Knowland of California 
supported Truman stating: 
[The President] has been authorized to do it under the terms 
of our obligations to the United Nations Charter. I believe 
that he has the authority to do it under his constitutional 
power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the 
United States. 
Certainly the action which has been taken to date is not one 
which would have required, or one in which I believe it was 
desirable to have, a declaration of war, as such, by the Con-
gress of the United States. What is being done is more in the 
nature of a police action. 113 
The Congress seemed convinced by Truman's characterization of 
the Korean deployment as a U.N. police action rather than U.S. war-
107 S.C. Res. 82, supra note 8, at 4. 
108 S.C. Res. 83, supra note 8, at 5. President Truman had already decided to commit U.S. forces 
before the Security Council approved the formation of a U.N. military force to defend South 
Korea. Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 621. 
109 Franck & Patel, supra note 20, at 71. 
110 Stromseth, Treaty Constraints, supra note 90, at 87. 
Ill Jd. 
112 Franck & Patel, supra note 20, at 71. 
113 96 CoNe. REc. 9540 (1950). 
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making. 114 When several Senators offered to bring a joint congressional 
regulation authorizing the use of U.S. troops, they were not encour-
aged by the President or other members of Congress who seemed to 
believe that such an authorization was unnecessary.115 On June 30, 
1950, the Senate overwhelmingly passed an appropriation of a large 
aid package for U.S. allies, with $16 million specifically designated for 
Korea and the Philippines. 116 
The failure of Congress to assert its role in the decision to deploy 
troops to Korea can be explained by several political, if not legal 
reasons. 117 First, almost every member of Congress agreed with the 
concept of sending U.S. forces to counter the attack by North Korea.ll8 
Second, most members agreed with the necessity to act quickly in an 
emergency and realized that forces had to be deployed before the 
situation in Korea deteriorated further. 119 Third, almost all members 
of Congress saw the need to stand behind the President and convey a 
sense of solidarity as troops were sent overseas to fight. 120 There was 
also a strong sense that the very survival of the U.N. depended on the 
United States, and most assumed that a prompt U.N. "police action" 
was the best way to avoid a possible third world war. 121 
Likewise, the Supreme Court, while not asked to address the consti-
tutionality of President Truman's actions directly, chose to avoid the 
issue of his actions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer: 122 In 
Youngstown, the Court found the President's seizure of the steel mills 
to support the effort in Korea unconstitutional, but did not find that 
he had entered this situation without constitutional authority. 123 In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Jackson wrote that he would "indulge the 
widest latitude of interpretation to sustain [the President's] exclusive 
function to command the instruments of national force, at least when 
turned against the outside world for the security of our society."124 
114 Franck & Patel, supra note 20, at 71. 
liS Id. 
11 6 See 96 CoNe. RE:c. 9546. 
117 See Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 630. 
11s Jd. 
119 Id. 
120 Jd. 
121 !d. at 631 (citing 96 CoN G. REc. 9334 (statement of Sen. Smith)). 
122 Franck & Patel, supra note 20, at 71; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579 (1952). 
123 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585-89; Franck & Patel, supra note 20, at 71. 
124 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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While the reaction to Truman's swift response to the Korea crisis 
and his belief that he had the unilateral authority to send U.S. forces 
abroad for "police actions" was generally supportive at the time, some 
scholars claim that he did not have that legal authority. 125 Michael 
Glennon, Professor of Law at University of California at Davis, for 
example, argues that the exclusive framework within which the Presi-
dent could introduce the armed forces into hostilities under the 
authority of the Security Council was the system involving Congress as 
outlined by Article 43.126 He emphasizes that the possibility of an 
alternative system was never discussed. 127 
Glennon also contends that since the Security Council merely rec-
ommended action in Korea under Article 39 of the Charter rather than 
passing a resolution requiring action under Article 42, the United 
States was not legally bound. 128 The President would have had a case 
for acting unilaterally in fulfillment of a legal obligation to the Secu-
rity Council only if the resolutions had been binding. 129 Glennon's 
views are also supported by Arthur Schlesinger who has written that 
the "U.N. resolutions ... justified American military action under 
international law, [but] they could not serve as a substitute for the 
congressional authorization required in national law by the Constitu-
tion. "130 
B. The Persian Gulf 
Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the U.N. re-
sponded with a series of increasingly forceful actions that eventually 
became the most far-reaching enforcement actions in the history of 
the organization. 131 These actions included numerous economic and 
diplomatic sanctions intended both to impair the Iraqi war machine 
and to isolate its regime from the world community.132 
President Bush announced on August 8, 1990, that he was sending 
a large contingent of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf 
as part of "Operation Desert Shield" to counter any further aggression 
125 See Franck & Patel, supra note 20, at 71. 
126 Michael]. Glennon, Agora: The Gulf Crisis-The Constitution and Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, 85 AM.]. lNT'L L. 74,80 (1991). 
121 Id. 
128 See id. at 81. 
129 ld. 
130 ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 133-34 (1973). 
l3l BAEHR & GORDENKER, supra note 79, at 72. 
132 Id. at 72-73. 
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by Iraq. 133 The next day, President Bush reported to Congress "consis-
tent with" the WPR, stating that he did not believe U.S. involvement 
in hostilities was imminent.134 This statement ensured that the sixty-day 
clock of the WPR would not start ticking. 135 
The President was strongly supported by Congress even though he 
had not formerly consulted with it before deploying troops.136 In Oc-
tober 1990, the House and the Senate both passed legislation support-
ing the President's actions but not supporting war. 137 Members made 
it clear, however, that while they were behind the President in his 
efforts to resolve the crisis, they were not providing him with a "blank 
check."138 
At the Administration's encouragement in November, 1990, the 
U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 678.139 This resolution in-
creased the pressure on Iraq by authorizing member states to use "all 
necessary means" to implement the Council's resolutions and to re-
store peace and security in the area unless Iraq complied with the 
provisions of the U.N. resolutions and withdrew from Kuwait by Janu-
ary 15, 1991.140 President Bush and members of his administration 
claimed that he did not need congressional authorization to use force 
to implement the U.N. resolutions. 141 Secretary of Defense Richard 
Cheney pointed to Korea as an illustration of ''well established princi-
ples" concerning the President's authority to send troops into com-
bat.142 In an appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee in December, Secretary of State James A. Baker III acknowledged 
that U.N. Resolution 678 did not require the use of force, and that any 
decision to use force would be made "at the top political levels of the 
countries making up the multinational force."143 He also stated that the 
133 Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 641. Within three months, 230,000 American troops 
were deployed in the region. /d. 
134 See 136 CoNG. REc. H8446 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1990). 
135 See 50 U.S.C. § 1545. 
136 Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 641. 
137 See Eileen Burgin, Rethinking the Role of the War Powers Resolution: Congress and the Persian 
GulfWar, 21]. LEGIS. 23,27 (1995). 
138 Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 641. 
139 See S.C. Res. 678, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. 5/RES/678 (1990), reprinted in 291.L.M. 
1565, 1565 (1990). 
140 /d. 
141 Burgin, supra note 137, at 27. 
142 Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 645. 
143 U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 101st 
Cong., 2d Sess. 152 (1990) (statement of james A. Baker, III, Secretary of State). 
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Bush Administration had made no decision to ask Congress for a 
declaration of war or a resolution of support and noted that "as a 
co-equal branch of Government the Congress could, if it chose to do 
so, express itself on this issue. "144 
The President was placing a strong emphasis on the historical prac-
tice of unilateral presidential actions. 145 The Administration also 
stressed that a declaration of war is not required when the country is 
participating as part of an "international force" operating under U.N. 
authorization. 146 The Administration put far less emphasis on the Se-
curity Council Resolutions as a basis for legal authority for the Presi-
dent's actions. 147 It is probable that this was a calculated move designed 
to preserve freedom of action for the U.S. military in the Gulf from 
any U.N. command structure that might be established.148 
Many members of Congress, however, were not so quick to yield the 
war powers issue to the President and urged him to seek congressional 
approvai.I49 When Congress reconvened in january, President Bush did 
request a congressional resolution supporting "the use of all means 
necessary to implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 678."150 The 
President's letter, however, did not refer to any obligation under the 
WPR and simply asked for Congress to ·~oin" with and "express its 
support" for him "at this critical time. "151 
The debate on whether the President was legally obligated to receive 
authorization from Congress when participating in a U.N. operation 
was taken up by legal scholars.152 Thomas Franck, editor-in-chief of the 
American journal of International Law and Faiza Patel, a Fellow at New 
York University School of Law, claim that the operation in the Persian 
Gulf, as with Korea, was a U.N. "police action" which had been estab-
lished by the U.N. Charter as an exclusive alternative to the traditional 
war system.153 They contend that the Senate rejected the traditional war 
144 !d. 
145Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 647. 
146 !d. 
147 !d. 
148 !d. 
149 See Burgin, supra note 137, at 27. 
150 Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Persian Gulf Crisis, 27 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 
18 Uan. 8, 1991). 
151 !d. 
152 See, e.g., Franck & Patel, supra note 20, at 64; Glennon, supra note 126, at 74. These articles 
are among several appearing in the AMERICAN JouRNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw under the 
heading "Agora: The Gulf Crisis" in which legal aspects of the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait 
were explored. 
153 See Franck & Patel, supra note 20, at 64. 
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system upon ratification of the U.N. Charter, thereby legislating the 
implementation of the new U.N. police power. 154 The possible claim 
that the WPR under Section 1547(a) 155 rescinded the United States' 
obligation under Article 42 of the U.N. Charter is countered by Section 
1547(d) (1) of the WPR itself, which declares that nothing in the WPR 
"is intended to alter ... the provisions of existing treaties. "156 In a case 
involving the closing of the PLO Observer Mission to the UN, in which 
a conflict arose between a treaty and a later statute, the Court ruled 
that the statute takes precedence only if the Court can discern "the 
clearest of expressions on the part of the Congress" to override the 
treaty obligation.157 There is no evidence which indicates that Congress 
intended the WPR to eliminate the United States' obligation to carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council under Article 42. 158 Franck 
and Patel conclude that the Council's resolutions validated a "police 
action" and that while it would be prudent for the President to consult 
with Congress, he is not obliged to do so because the U.N. system was 
created to make a state's unilateral decision to go to war unnecessary. 159 
Professor Glennon argues, as he did with regard to war powers 
authority in the Korean War, that U.N. Resolution 678 authorizing 
action in the Gulf imposed no obligation on the United States to use 
force. 160 He characterizes Resolution 678 as "permissive" rather than 
"obligatory," and thus there was no requirement that the President 
"take care" that a permissive decision by the Security Council be faith-
fully executed as part of a binding treaty.161 As the Resolution is volun-
tary, it is left to the discretion of the member states of the U.N. whether 
or not to cooperate with the Government of Kuwait.162 Glennon con-
tinues to argue that only under the proposed special agreements of 
Article 43 of the U.N. Charter may Congress prospectively approve of 
the use of force without requiring subsequent approval. 163 Glennon 
154 /d. at 65. 
155 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a). Section 1547 states that the authority to introduce the armed forces of 
the United States into hostilities shall not be inferred from any provision of a law unless the 
provision specifically authorizes the introduction of such forces and states that it is intended as 
specific statutory authorization under the Resolution. /d. 
156Jd. § 1547(d)(1). 
!57 United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1468 (S.D.N.Y 1988); see also 
Franck & Patel, supra note 20, at 72-73. 
158 Franck & Patel, supra note 20, at 73. 
159 /d. at 74. 
160 Glennon, supra note 126, at 75; see also S.C. Res. 678, supra note 139, at 1565. 
161 Glennon, supra note 126, at 75. 
162 /d. at 82. 
163 /d. at 86. 
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thus concludes that it is doubtful that the Charter empowers the 
Council to require the use of force absent an Article 43 agreement.164 
If a resolution to use force does come before the Security Council, the 
President cannot permit the U.S. representative to vote for it unless 
Congress has granted authorization or the particular use of force falls 
clearly within the President's exclusive constitutional power.165 
Despite the unresolved debate on whether Congressional consent 
was required by law, Congress responded to President Bush's letter with 
a joint resolution on January 12.166 The resolution authorized the use 
of force pursuant to Security Council Resolution 678 in light of the 
President's determination that "the United States ha[d] used all ap-
propriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain" Iraq's com-
pliance with the Security Council's resolutions and "those efforts have 
not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance."167 
According to one analyst, the resolution amounted to "a conditional 
declaration of war. "168 
President Bush's decision to seek congressional support and the fact 
that Congress voted to authorize war might suggest some degree of 
"political accommodation. "169 Under this "model" of the division of war 
powers, the President needs congressional approval before committing 
substantial numbers of troops authorized by the U.N. Security Coun-
cil.l70 The scope of the operation and the relative degree of sacrifice 
and risk involved trigger the congressional power to declare war. 171 The 
President's actions throughout the crisis and his strong statements 
afterward, however, suggest that this political accommodation was not 
the case. 172 
164 Id. at 88. 
165 I d. 
166 See Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 
105 Stat. 3, 4 (1991). 
167 ld. 
168 Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 650 (citing Memorandum from David Ackerman, 
Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service to Rep. Fascell, 137 CoNG. REc. H446 (daily 
ed. Jan. 12, 1991) ). 
169 ld. at 654. 
170 ld. 
171 See id. 
172 Remarks of President George Bush to the Texas State Republican Convention in Dallas, 
Texas, 28 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1119, 1120-21 (June 20, 1992). President Bush later stated, 
"I didn't have to get permission from some old goat in the United States Congress to kick Saddam 
Hussein out of Kuwait." Id. 
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President Bush did not engage in meaningful consultation with 
members of Congress on events in the Gulf as per the WPR and never 
sought the opinion of Congress before making a decision. 173 As an aide 
to the President commented, "[i]t'll be easier to get the U.N. to agree 
than Congress."174 Meanwhile, another aide pointed out, "[i]t's true 
we've promised to consult Congress if there's a war. In other words, 
we'll phone them after the first bombs have been dropped."175 
The Administration did not consult with Congress on its choice to 
seek the Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of "all neces-
sary means" to expel Iraq from Kuwait. 176 President Bush explained this 
course of action saying, "I cannot consult with 535 strong-willed indi-
viduals. I can't do it nor does my responsibility under the Constitution 
compel me to do that."177 The President took this position while it was 
clear that Security Council Resolution 678 and the deadline imposed 
by it would set in motion developments affecting U.S. forces and their 
risk of involvement in hostilities. 178 
In order for the model of "political accommodation" to work, Con-
gress must assert its constitutional power and the President must be 
willing to accept that assertiveness. 179 The Congress, however, did not 
do its part in forcing the President to comply with the consultative and 
reporting requirements of the WPR.180 Although members of Congress 
introduced legislation pertaining to both the application and circum-
vention of the WPR reporting requirements, the Congress as a whole 
did not address the President's disregard for the law in a manner 
intended by the sponsors of the WPR untilJanuary. 181 The late Senator 
John Heinz, speaking in January stated: 
I believe that it is unfortunate that we shirked that [War 
Powers] responsibility for months. There is more than 
enough blame to go around: we in the Congress wanted to 
play a waiting game, and the President supported that game 
173 Burgin, supra note 137 at 28; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1542. 
174 P. SALINGER & E. LAURENT, SECRET DosSIER: THE HIDDEN AGENDA BEHIND THE GULF WAR 
176 (1991). 
175 !d. 
176 Burgin, supra note 137, at 30. 
177 !d. 
178 !d. 
179 Stromseth, Rethinking, supra note 5, at 655. 
180 Burgin, supra note 137, at 33. 
181 !d. 
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since it provided him with the latitude he needed and wanted 
in dealing with the United Nations and Iraq. 182 
When Congress finally decided to act in January, the skillful advance 
work of the Bush Administration had ensured that members of Con-
gress voting against the mission would face the politically unpalatable 
option of voting against a U .S.-led mission that was supported by a 
majority of foreign countries in the U.N. 183 As former Secretary of the 
Navy John Lehman wrote, "Desert Storm drove the final nail into the 
War Powers Resolution. "184 
C. Haiti 
The deployment of troops to Haiti by President Clinton in Septem-
ber, 1994 is a unique case for the war powers debate in several respects. 
The most obvious point is that the planned military invasion was 
aborted hours before it was to take place, becoming instead a "consen-
sual" operation. 185 The more interesting point is the unique way in 
which the Clinton Administration justified its actions, taking a different 
stance from the positions of previous administrations which had also 
encountered the war powers debate. 186 
In the weeks leading up to the Haiti operation, President Clinton 
echoed the claims of his predecessors regarding the powers of the 
President as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, stating, "[l]ike 
my predecessors of both parties, I have not agreed that I was constitu-
tionally mandated to get" congressional approval before taking military 
action.187 It was therefore surprising that the legal opinion on the 
deployment, put forth in a letter to congressional leaders by Walter 
Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, 
was almost deferential in tone. 188 
182137 CoNG. REc. S313 (daily ed.Jan. 11, 1991). 
183 See Burgin, supra note 137, at 35. An Administration official asked, "How could our Congress 
not support something that Ethiopia was supporting? That the Soviet Union was supporting?" !d. 
at 35 n.80 (citing U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., TRIUMPH WITHOUT VICTORY 198-99 (1992)). 
1R4LEHMAN, supra note 9, at 53. 
185 See Lori F. Damrosch, Agora: The 1994 U.S. Action in Haiti-The Constitutional Responsibility 
of Congress for Military Engagements, 89 AM.]. INT'L L. 58 (1995). A deal was struck between 
President Clinton's emissaries (former President Carter, Senator Sam Nunn and General Colin 
Powell) and members of the Haitian military junta on September 18, 1994 averting an invasion 
by U.S. forces. !d. 
186 !d. at 60. 
187 Presidential News Conference, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1994, at A16. 
188 See Contemporary Practice of the United States: Deployment of U.S. Military Forces into Haiti-
The Dellinger Letter, 89 AM.]. INT'L L. 122, 122 (1995) [hereinafter Dellinger Letter]. 
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The Dellinger letter presents three arguments supporting the Presi-
dent's plan for an invasion of Haiti. First, it contends that the planned 
deployment was consistent with the "sense of Congress" as expressed 
in the Defense Appropriations Act of 1994.189 Second, it maintains the 
deployment satisfied the requirements of the War Powers Resolution. 190 
The Administration's final claim is that after examining the circum-
stances, nature, scope and duration of the anticipated deployment, it 
determined that the operation was "not a 'war' in the constitutional 
sense. "191 
The first contention declared that it was the "sense of Congress" that 
the President did not need to seek prior authorization once he had 
made certain required findings and reported them to Congress as he 
had done. 192 Scholars have criticized this statutory argument as "im-
plausible" because it bases the legality of the invasion on an obscure 
piece of legislation dating from a year earlier. 193 The tenor of the 
debate in Congress in the months preceding the deployment, however, 
certainly did not support the idea that Congress had already granted 
authorization to a troop deployment to Haiti. 194 
The Dellinger letter then claims that the WPR recognizes the right 
of the President to deploy armed forces into hostilities or situations 
where they are likely to be encountered, provided that he notify Con-
gress within forty-eight hours of introducing the armed forces. 195 The 
Administration views the intention of the WPR as the prevention of 
long, drawn-out conflicts such as Vietnam, rather than "prohibiting the 
President from using or threatening to use troops to achieve important 
diplomatic objectives where the risk of sustained military conflict was 
negligible."196 Professor Lori Damrosch of Columbia University Law 
School argues that this construction of the WPR allows the President 
to do anything he wishes on his own, as long as he can accomplish his 
goals in sixty or ninety days of hostilities. 197 She argues that compliance 
with the WPR's procedural requirements can in no way substitute for 
the constitutional duty to obtain congressional authority before engag-
189 /d. 
190 /d. 
191 /d. 
192 /d. at 123. 
193 Damrosch, supra note 185, at 61. The piece of legislation at issue is Section 8147 of 
the Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, 107 Stat. 1418 
(1993). /d. 
194 /d. at 62. 
195 Dellinger Letter, supra note 188, at 123; see also 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (1)-(3). 
196 Dellinger Letter, supra note 188, at 124. 
197Damrosch, supra note 185, at 63-64. 
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ing U.S. forces in combat, at least where nothing prevents a timely 
congressional decision.198 
The claim in the Dellinger letter that the deployment was not a "war" 
is based on the nature, scope and duration of the deployment as well 
as the belief that the legitimate government of Haiti had given full 
consent. 199 Dellinger states that the lawful government of President 
Aristide had granted approval for the deployment, and when coupled 
with its expected limited nature, scope and duration, the deployment 
did not rise to the level of "war. "200 Damrosch criticizes this view because 
it again implies that the President can do anything he likes as long as 
it is resolved quickly. 201 
Conspicuous by its absence in Dellinger's defense of the Administra-
tion's action in Haiti is the claim that congressional consent to a 
military action might not be required when the U.N. Security Council 
has already granted its approval.202 The Senate seems to have attempted 
to pre-empt this claim by including an amendment to the 1995 Defense 
Appropriations Bill (which passed unanimously) stating that "[i]t is the 
sense of the Senate that the United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tion 940 ... does not constitute authorization for the deployment of 
United States Armed Forces in Haiti under the Constitution of the 
United States or pursuant to the War Powers Resolution. "203 The Dellin-
ger letter avoids discussion of the Security Council mandate and its 
effect, if any, on the legal authority of the President.204 
III. POSSIBILITIES FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Special Agreements Under Article 4 3 
The enactment of Article 43 agreements, as envisioned by the U.N. 
Charter and under which the United States would make a commitment 
to supply troops at the request of the Security Council, would formalize 
the current ad hoc process for U.N. military missions. 205 This formali-
zation, however, would present at least two potential problems in the 
198 !d. at 64. 
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United States. The first would be the placement of U.S. troops under 
foreign command and the second would be the delegation of the 
President's powers as Commander in Chief to the Security Council.2°6 
Under an Article 43 agreement, American armed forces would be 
delegated to the Security Council and could conceivably fight under 
foreign command. 207 American forces did serve under foreign com-
mand in World Wars I and II, but this occurred only in short-term 
emergency situations which would not provide a precedent for an 
Article 43 agreement. 208 During the World Wars, the United States was 
fighting a particular enemy in a particular war in an alliance from 
which it could have withdrawn. 209 An Article 43 agreement would 
present a different situation as it involves permanent Security Council 
command over certain U.S. forces. 210 
The issue of Security Council command over U.S. forces raises a 
constitutional issue as it appears to conflict with the President's role as 
Commander in Chief.211 An initial commitment of U.S. forces for a 
single, narrowly defined military operation under an Article 43 force 
agreement may not be unconstitutional if the American chain of com-
mand were preserved.212 While troops would be on call for Security 
Council duty, the United States could use its veto in the Council to 
block any proposal for action, thus insuring that any enforcement 
action would proceed with the approval of the U.S. President.213 
A problem might arise, however, if U.S. forces are already involved 
in a U.N. action and the President is prevented from bringing the 
troops home at will.214 The termination of Security Council actions 
requires another decision by the Council which then faces a veto by 
any of its five permanent members. 215 The President cannot make an 
independent decision to withdraw U.S. troops because they are under 
the command of the Security Council upon their activation. 216 
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In light of these potential problems and the political difficulties of 
placing U.S. forces under foreign commanders, perhaps a modified 
Article 43 agreement would be more feasible. One option is an agree-
ment under which the United States would be permitted to maintain 
its constitutional war powers processes and the right to withdraw its 
troops unilaterally.217 Another option is the idea of "policy declaration" 
which was proposed by President Bush and essentially consists of a 
promise by the United States that it is U.S. policy (rather than legal 
obligation) to commit troops for Security Council actions.218 The prob-
lem with these approaches is that other nations might also seek similar 
concessions, and the result would be no different from the ad hoc 
arrangement which has existed for the past fifty years. 
B. Congressional Concerns 
The experiences over the past twenty years have demonstrated the 
flaws of the WPR and the need for it to be either discarded completely 
or overhauled in order to accommodate the increasing use of U.N. 
Security Council actions to counter aggression and respond to crises 
around the world. If it is to be retained, the WPR must more clearly 
delineate authority between the President and the Congress, and pro-
visions for the implementation of Security Council Resolutions must 
somehow be incorporated into its complex set of procedures. The 
difficulty in accomplishing this task might demonstrate the virtue of 
presidential primacy in these issues and thus provide an impetus for 
abolishing the WPR altogether. 
Congress is indeed a "major architect of the international system and 
an indispensable player in U.S. operations within it."219 In order to 
support the U.N. system of collective security, Congress needs to sup-
port the executive in ways that send a clear message of national re-
solve.220 While Congress was granted the power to declare war by the 
Constitution, the document does not speak of the division of war 
powers with regard to the discharge of obligations in a collective 
security system. 221 Since Korea, however, history and practice demon-
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strate that the balance of power in this area has shifted toward the 
President. 222 
This is not to imply that the President can proceed uninhibited in 
matters of collective security. No President can or should conduct 
extended military operations abroad without the wide support that 
Congress reflects. 223 Congress wields impressive power through its con-
stitutionally-granted power over appropriations.224 During the Vietnam 
War, which was prosecuted by several Presidents without a declaration 
of war by the Congress, Senator J.W. Fulbright of Arkansas advocated 
what he termed "fencing in" the President's ability to use appropriated 
funds as a way for Congress to influence the fighting. 225 
Senator Fulbright's goal was not to convince the President to accept 
the views of Congress because he believed this would impinge on the 
President's prerogative to conduct foreign policy and serve as Com-
mander in Chief. 226 His aim was instead to compel the President to 
reconsider his policies if his original plans and estimates were incor-
rect.227 If the President's plans did go awry, he would then have to 
approach Congress to explain the failure and request additional ap-
propriations. 228 
Unlike the constitutionally questionable and procedurally compli-
cated WPR, the "Fulbright Approach" is based on the straightforward, 
non-contested power of the Congress to "raise and support" the armed 
forces of the United States.229 This approach allows Congress to exert 
a limited degree of influence in foreign affairs as the Founding Fathers 
intended.230 By virtue of its simple constitutional grounding, it may be 
applied universally in foreign affairs including U.S. participation in 
U.N. missions. 
CONCLUSION 
The United Nations, while rightfully disparaged for its ineffective-
ness on many global issues, has made a positive contribution for peace 
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and security by outlawing war and establishing a collective security 
system under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The United States has 
been able to use the U.N. system to its advantage in Korea, the Persian 
Gulf and Haiti by pulling together member states to contribute forces 
for international police actions while fulfilling U.S. foreign policy ob-
jectives at the same time. The relative success of this ad hoc collective 
security system has demonstrated that a more formal system under 
Article 43, with national forces set aside for Security Council duty, is 
unnecessary. The current informal system also avoids the constitu-
tional complications of the Article 43 system by allowing the President 
to retain his role as Commander in Chief of U.S. forces. This arrange-
ment preserves freedom of action and permits the United States to 
decline involvement in conflicts where a vital national interest is not 
at stake. 
While the congressional power to declare war has been rendered 
obsolete under the U.N. system and the WPR represents a failed at-
tempt to encroach upon the President's right to conduct foreign pol-
icy, Congress has an important supporting role to play in foreign 
affairs. Congress should abolish the controversial and procedurally 
complex WPR and instead exercise its influence in foreign affairs 
through its power of the purse. As the prospects for the long term 
success of initiatives often turn on the dependability of financial and 
political support from Congress, the President will continue to have a 
strong interest in consultations and cooperation. The balance of power 
that the Founding Fathers envisioned thus continues to be maintained 
in the post-Cold War collective security system. 
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